What is the rationale for the Tumas FID deferral?

The decision not to proceed with the Final Investment Decision (FID) was not due to any project weakness, but based purely on market conditions. Utilities, especially US utilities, need to realize that the uranium industry can only be recapitalized and exploration can only be incentivized when uranium prices rise. So my approach, an approach vindicated by others in the industry, is that we will not talk seriously to utilities until the incentive price is enough to justify development of greenfield projects. 

Could you elaborate on the progress at Tumas?

Deep Yellow is well cashed-up, with about US$220 million in the bank, so we were able to continue works without being caught in the tangle of financing. The project has now progressed to Phase Three of detailed engineering, with Ausenco handling the processing plant, while we manage offsite infrastructure, including power, water and roads. Most companies reach FID at 30% engineering completed, primarily on the front end, whereas we’ll be at up to 70% when Phase 3 finishes. We are also implementing innovative construction methods like off-site fabrication and pre-cast concrete to save time and reduce on-site risks. This strategy ensures the project can start construction quickly and efficiently once market conditions justify it.

How do you see the uranium supply gap evolving over the next decade?

Supply sector stagnation since 2012 and weak uranium prices has created a major supply deficit going forward. Current consumption is 180 million lb/y—growing to around 300 million lb/y by 2040—which means we need 130 million lb/y of new resources by the mid-2030s. With 50 million lb/y from current production lost to depleting mines, we must find 200 million lb/y in 15 years. Most greenfield projects are years away from production.

I take a visionary look to understand where nuclear is going and the type of companies the space needs in the 2030s. We have two greenfield projects scheduled to go into production before the end of 2030 (in 2027 and 2029). With our projects, we are looking at a 35- to 40-year life of mine. The reason for that has always been to establish long-term customers, create a stable revenue runway, and provide a foundation for the people who will run Deep Yellow after I’m gone. This will allow them to grow production from 5–7 million lb/y to 15–20 million lb/y, which is where I believe Deep Yellow needs to be.

In what ways are new drivers, like data centers and AI, shaping the uranium demand curve?

Current demand for nuclear is unprecedented. Previously, China led nuclear expansion. Now, after 15 years of stagnant fleet growth, every new reactor being built requires four times the typical annual uranium for its initial core. Vendors must supply a year’s worth of uranium during construction—1,000-megawatt reactors need 1.8–2 million lb initially, then 500,000 lb/y. This pushes demand for both new and existing reactors.

This is without including the hyper-scalers with their data centers, and AI aspirations, which most analysts haven’t yet fully accounted for in their models. The US will require the equivalent of Japan’s entire electricity consumption just to support AI and data centers by 2030. Meanwhile, the scale of the problem is so huge that data center operators will burn anything—coal, gas, you name it—because the competition for economic supremacy is enormous. Eventually, with focus on low emissions, nuclear will begin to dominate.

Do you have a final message?

The problem with the energy transition, or energy crisis, is the oversimplification of the challenge by ideologically driven politicians who think a 300-year Industrial Revolution, with all the capitalization this required, can be transformed in 20 years. Hydrogen and renewables have challenges that are not fully appreciated. 

Transitioning from gas and coal will take longer than many expect. Nuclear, however, remains central, especially for hyper-scalers. Modern reactors are like the pyramids of our days, with lifespans lasting for a century. Nuclear plants don’t become redundant just because a more efficient technology comes along. For example, a reactor built in 1954 was still operating until five years ago.